Abstract: A familiar post-Kantian criticism contends that Kant enslaves sensibility under the yoke of practical reason.
people develop their moral feelings further, they will experience increasingly greater joy in moral action and, thus, the moral law will come to feel less and less like a constraint at all. However, the second stage of Kant's argument depends intimately on the first stage. For, contrary to the suggestions of recent commentators, Kant does not primarily attempt to overcome the feeling of tyranny by emphasizing the role of pleasure in successful moral action. Instead, Kant argues that our ability to take increasing pleasure in moral action depends on the fact that we already do not feel the moral law as tyrannous. And the reason why we do not feel the moral law as tyrannous is, specifically, because our awareness that the moral law is self-legislated results in a feeling of sublimity, independent of our attempts to fulfill the moral law. Kant's focus on the sublimity that accompanies our consideration of the moral law allows Kant, unlike Schiller, to explain how even people who fail to comply with the moral law need not feel tyrannized by the moral law and, thus, also allows Kant to provide a superior account of our ability to develop our moral feelings over time. In this way, Kant defends the integrity of his moral theory by criticizing Schiller for overlooking the various roles played in our overall moral experience by the feeling of sublimity that accompanies our contemplation of the moral law.
Unfortunately, recent commentators have failed to recognize the two-stage structure of Kant's response to Schiller. This observation applies even to commentators who indicate that sublimity might play some role in Kant's debate with Schiller. 7 For example, Frederick Beiser draws attention to a possible role for the sublime in Kant's reply to Schiller when he suggests that Kant perhaps began to emphasize the role of "pleasure and self-elevation" in moral action in order to emphasize that the moral law is a law that we give to ourselves (Beiser 2005, 182 ; emphasis added). Beiser writes:
[T]he concepts of moral pleasure and of moral feeling stress the satisfaction of the agent in recognizing his own powers of moral autonomy: the agent finds satisfaction in acting morally because he has achieved self-mastery over his inclinations and because he has acted according to self-imposed principles. (Beiser 2005, 182) Beiser is absolutely correct to note that the notions of self-elevation, self-mastery, and self-imposed principles play an important role in Kant's response to Schiller. The limitation of Beiser's interpretation, however, is that Beiser focuses only on the satisfaction that accompanies "acting morally", rather than on the sublime feeling that we experience when we simply contemplate the moral law (Beiser 2005, 182;  emphasis added). But, as we will see below, the satisfaction that we experience when we act according to self-imposed principles, which Kant refers to as "contentment" [Zufriedenheit] , differs from the 7 Guyer (1993 Guyer ( , 2006 does not draw much attention to the role of the sublime in Kant's response to Schiller, preferring to focus on Kant's discussion of cheerfulness and joy in moral action at the end of the Religion footnote. Gauthier (1997, 524ff.) notes that Kant regards the moral law as sublime and awe inspiring. However, Gauthier fails to recognize the role that the sublimity of the moral law plays as a response to Schiller, rather than merely as a confession that we cannot achieve moral perfection. Gauthier's suggestion is that the feeling of sublimity plays a role in Kant's account of moral motivation; he does not focus on to what extent the feeling of sublimity provides a response to the feeling of being tyrannized by the moral law.
sublime feeling that Kant claims we experience when we simply contemplate that the moral law is a 
Grace and Dignity
To begin, it is important to recognize that Schiller largely viewed himself as a Kantian. For example, in a letter to his friend Christian Gottfried Körner, Schiller writes, "It is certain that no mortal has spoken a 8 In her most recent work, Baxley briefly indicates that the moral law is not painful or despotic, at least in part, because "the feeling of respect the moral elicits in us is akin to a feeling of awe and sublimity in response to the unconditional dignity tied up with our own self-legislating rational nature" (Baxley 2010b, 113) . Taken in isolation, Baxley's short, suggestive remark is consonant with the interpretation developed below. However, both Baxley's general interpretation of this feeling of sublimity and her characterization of its function in Kant's overall argument are highly ambiguous. In general, Baxley's discussions of Kant's remarks regarding feeling in the Religion footnote emphasize Kant's comments on joyfulness and cheer, rather than sublimity. In fact, the brief passage cited above constitutes the entire extent of Baxley's discussion regarding the role of sublimity in Kant's response to Schiller. Importantly, Baxley does not address the question of how exactly Kant's discussions of sublimity and joyfulness in the Religion footnote are related to each other.
Consequently, Baxley does not clearly acknowledge the primacy of Kant's appeal to sublimity in his response to Schiller.
In other words, Baxley does not note the way in which Kant's discussion of joy relies on his prior argument about sublimity, a topic discussed in part 3 below. Moreover, in the cited passage Baxley refers to the sublimity of our "selflegislating rational nature" (Baxley 2010b, 113) . By itself, this remark might suggest a feeling of sublimity related merely to our consideration of the fact that we ourselves legislate the moral law, rather than a feeling directly tied to our having successfully acted according to the moral law. But it also might not. And while discussing Kant's description of respect in the Metaphysics of Morals, Baxley actually seems to make the same mistake as Beiser and Schiller. Namely, Baxley seems to conflate, rather than sharply distinguish, the positive feeling that accompanies our consideration of the moral law and the positive feeling that we experience upon acting consistently with the moral law (Baxley 2010b, 153 :281/GD 147). As a result, "his inner self-sufficiency disappears" (NA 20:281/GD 147). To obey the moral law is necessary in order to escape the slavery of mere instinct. Even a will that chooses to act on instinct, rather than in accords with the moral law, remains "within nature" (NA 20:291/GD 155). And such a will fails to raise itself to "divinity" (NA 20:290/GD 155).
But while Schiller agrees that people should not be slaves to their sensible natures, he also insists that inclination should not be completely dominated by reason. For according to Schiller, the "triumph" of the will should not be based on the "subjugation" of sensibility (NA 20:284/GD 150). Schiller's argument for this claim is actually rooted in an aesthetic demand. 9 As Schiller writes:
Human beings, as appearance, are also an object of the senses. Where the moral feeling finds satisfaction, the aesthetic feeling does not wish to be reduced, and the correspondence with an idea may not sacrifice any of the appearance. Thus, however rigorously reason demands an ethical expression, the eye demands beauty just as persistently. Since both these demands are made of the same object, although they come from different courts of judgment, satisfaction for both must be found in the same source. The frame of mind in which a human being is most able to fulfill his moral purpose must permit the type of expression that is also most advantageous for him as simple appearance. In other words: moral capacity must reveal itself through grace. Put otherwise, our aesthetic sense demands that moral actions appear graceful. Graceful movements must exhibit freedom and ease. 10 But as Schiller notes, "Under [reason's] strict discipline, the sensuous will thus appear to be suppressed and the inner opposition will be evidenced from outside in constraint" (NA 20:280/GD 147). Thus, if a person must dominate her inclinations through an act of will in order to follow the moral law, then that person's actions and movements will not appear graceful. For the strain of overcoming one's recalcitrant inclinations will display itself in one's bodily movements. 11 Schiller also believes that immoral actions cannot appear graceful, no matter how easily they are performed.
And, thus, Schiller concludes that grace appears only when neither reason nor inclination dominates the other. As Schiller writes:
9 Guyer (2006) emphasizes this point. Guyer writes, "For Schiller, that complete attunement of principle and feeling that expresses itself in grace is indeed an imperative, but an aesthetic demand rather than a strictly moral demand" (Guyer 2006, 194) .
10 It is worth noting here that in the Kallias Letters, which were not published during Schiller's lifetime, he goes so far as to define all beauty as freedom of appearance. He writes, "Beauty is thus nothing less than freedom in appearance" (NA 26:183/K 152).
When neither reason dominating the sensuous, nor sensuous dominating reason is compatible with beauty of expression, then (as there is no fourth alternative) the state of mind in which reason and sensuousness -duty and inclination -coincide will be the condition under which the beauty of play occurs. (NA 20:282/GD 148) In other words, Schiller's aesthetic concerns require that duty and inclination exist in a harmony, where neither dominates the other.
Schiller, however, does not believe that Kant achieves a harmony between duty and inclination.
According to Thus, Schiller attempts to amend Kant's moral theory by arguing that people should "combine enjoyment with duty" and "obey their reason with joy" (NA 20:283/GD 149). To this effect, Schiller introduces his own theory of the beautiful soul. As he writes, "It is in a beautiful soul that sensuousness and reason, duty and inclination are in harmony, and grace is their expression as appearance" (NA 20:288/GD 153). And he describes the beautiful soul in more detail as follows:
One refers to a beautiful soul when the ethical sense has at last so taken control of all a person's feelings that it can leave affect to guide the will without hesitation and is never in danger of standing in contradiction of its decisions […] . It carries out mankind's most exacting duties with such ease that they might simply be the actions of its inner instinct, and the most heroic sacrifice that it exacts from natural impulse appears to the eye as a free operation of this impulse. (NA 20:287/GD 152) It is important to recognize that Schiller agrees with Kant that reason, rather than inclination, should legislate what our duties are. As he says, inclination is "not in a position to vouch for" the moral law (NA 20:283/GD 149). Schiller's major suggestion, however, is that a beautiful soul successfully combines enjoyment with duty by acting not out of strict respect for the moral law but, instead, out of an "inclination for duty" (NA 20:283/GD 149 an inclination for duty out of her initial respect for the moral law. 12 And, as a result, the beautiful soul feels inclined to perform particular actions specifically because they are duties. In other words, she is attracted to duty as such. The last sentence here clarifies that the wanderer responds to the wounded man because it is his duty to do so. But, presumably, the wanderer also responds out of an inclination -namely, an inclination for duty. The beautiful soul, then, acts out of an inclination (albeit an inclination for duty) rather than out of strict respect for the moral law. We might say that she finds duty itself charming and, thus, performs her duties with joy and ease. 13 I acknowledge that this interpretation of Schiller's inclination for duty is, like any interpretation of this point, controversial. I take it, however, to be a recognizable, traditional interpretation. Allison (1990, 183) and Baxley (2003, 505; 2010b, 109) seem to interpret Schiller's inclination for duty as I do here -namely, as an inclination for duty as such, i.e., an inclination for duty qua duty. Most importantly, we shall see below that Kant appears to interpret Schiller in this manner.
Immediately and provisionally, I confess that in the chief points of moral doctrine I think completely like a Kantian. Kant has a limited view of the ways in which people can perform duties because they are duties. Given that the beautiful soul does perform her duties because they are duties, we should feel no qualms in allowing her to act merely from inclination (albeit from an inclination for duty). The beautiful soul's own rational nature legislates the moral law to which her sensuous nature is, then, inclined. Indeed, as a 15 Here I have followed the translation of this passage in Beiser (2005, 173) .
16 Baxley (2010a Baxley ( , 1087 2010b, 93) also emphasizes that character is the object of moral evaluation for Schiller, although
Baxley does not dwell on the fact Schiller regards individual moral actions as lacking moral worth. 17 Beiser has suggested that, at least in On Grace and Dignity, Schiller merely intends to supplement Kant's own theory of moral action with a theory of moral character. See (Beiser 2005, 178 f.) . The argument here, however, shows that
Beiser's interpretation is, at least to some extent, misguided. For, unlike Schiller, Kant does not appear to believe that individual moral actions lack moral worth. 18 Although I shall not discuss the issue in great detail here, commentators now routinely recognize that Kant does not intend for his requirement that people act out of strict respect for the moral law always to exclude inclination completely from moral action. Kant certainly allows people to act on inclinations that do not conflict with their duties. And he also requires that people cultivate certain feelings that generally promote moral action. For a succinct defense of all of these points, see Guyer (2000, 287ff.) .
constrains our natural impulses. Over the course of her life, a person who wants to comply with the moral law will, inevitably, have to sacrifice some of her own personal desires and interests. And the pain of such personal sacrifices "awakens resistance and struggle, which we perceive in fulfilling them" (AA 27:490/LE 259). 26 As the fulfillment of the moral law inevitably entails some degree of personal sacrifice, "it is contrary to the nature of duty to enjoy having duties upon one" (AA 27:490/LE 259). It is, thus, deeply mysterious how anyone could ever be sensibly attracted to duty as such.
At first we might wonder whether Kant has missed Schiller's point. After all, Schiller argues that a person who has developed an inclination for duty desires to comply with the moral law. Thus, compliance with the moral law does not require any real personal sacrifice. But perhaps Kant has the following point in mind. Given that the moral law creates personal hardship, how could one ever come to be attracted to the moral law? The only answer appears to be that one might become attracted to the moral law because one recognizes that it possesses insurmountable worth. Indeed, this must be what
Schiller intends when he vaguely says, " [T] he ethical sense has at last so taken control of all a person's feelings that it can leave the affect to guide the will without hesitation" (NA 20:287/GD 152). But, as
Kant notes, our appreciation for the moral law's worth "is nothing more than man's respect for the moral law, and that provides no ground for supposing a charm that attracts us to fulfilling it" (AA 27:490/LE 259; emphases added). 27 In other words, it is far from obvious how our feeling of respect could ever be transformed into an inclination for duty as such. And surely the burden falls on Schiller to explain this point. 26 Baxley suggests that Kant's discussion of our ineluctable reluctance to follow the moral law is merely a description of the metaphysical fact that we (unlike God) are always capable of being tempted to violate the moral law and does not refer to the phenomenology of moral experience. See Baxley (2010b, 110) . However, Baxley is unable to account for the cited passage; additionally, Baxley's metaphysical interpretation of reluctance seems to be at odds with Kant's discussion of the painful side of respect in the Critique of Practical Reason. These interpretive difficulties are, perhaps, symptomatic of the fact that Baxley does not specify the precise role of sublimity in Kant's argument (including the painful side of sublimity, And Kant illustrates his point with an (unfortunately sexist) example: "Women especially insist that no coercion should be evinced towards them, that it should seem as if they were doing a kindness, when duty tells them to act" (AA 27:491/LE 260). In other words, people are not attracted to duty as such. In fact, people seem reluctant to perform actions that they might otherwise willingly perform when told that they have to perform those actions because they are duties. For duty, then, appears to be "coercion" (AA 27:491/LE 260). And nobody is attracted to being coerced. We might note that these points all suggest that Kant rejects Schiller's own positive theory largely due to common sense points about human nature rather than on a metaphysical distinction between active reason and passive inclinations (as Gauthier (1997) suggests), or due to a general pessimism about the moral capacities of humans (as Baxley (2003; 2008; 2010a; and 2010b) suggests).
Returning to the Religion footnote, the joy that Kant's virtuous person feels in her compliance with duty is, thus, not the joy that Schiller's beautiful soul would feel in the satisfaction of an inclination to duty. Rather, Kant most likely has two alternate sources of joyfulness in mind. First, Kant believes that compliance with the moral law is itself a source of pleasure. He refers to "moral feeling" as "the susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the moral law" (AA 6:399/PP 528). Thus, the awareness that our actions are consistent with the moral law produces a pleasurable feeling. Second, commentators routinely recognize that Kant allows for people to determine their will out of respect for the moral law while still satisfying inclinations that do not conflict with the moral law. And Kant also makes it a duty to cultivate particular feelings that tend to promote actions in conformity with the moral law, such as the feeling of sympathy (AA 6:457/PP 575). Thus, compliance with the moral law will often satisfy both natural and cultivated desires, providing joy. Now, Schiller, remember, argues that an inclination for duty is necessary to not regard the moral law as a foreign and positive law. Thus, for Schiller taking joy in the moral law is a means to not experiencing the moral law as a tyrannous yoke. For Kant, however, joy does not play this role. Instead, we have seen that Kant attempts to overcome the moral law's alleged tyranny by emphasizing the role of sublimity in moral experience. In fact, Kant appears to believe that the joy a person experiences in her compliance with the moral law is a sign that she already does not regard the constraint of the moral law as a tyrannous constraint. As Kant says in the Vigilantius Lectures:
[W]e may assuredly take it, that so long as anyone bows to the law only with grief and lamentation, and it costs him trouble to fulfil it, he is still nurturing a hatred for that law, as the slave does his master. (AA 27:656/LE 392) In other words, if a person hates the moral law and, thus, views it as a tyrannous yoke, then she will not find it easy to comply with the moral law. For she will feel extreme regret at the sacrifice of her own personal interests for the sake of a law that she does not truly value. In contrast, someone who values the moral law may still experience the moral law as a constraint. But she need not experience it as a tyrannous constraint. Therefore, she will be able to take pleasure in the knowledge that her actions comply with the moral law. As discussed above, the sublime feeling of the moral law ensures that we need not feel the moral law to be a tyrannous constraint; we need not nurture "a hatred for that law" (AA 27:656/LE 392). In this way, the sublime feeling of the moral law is logically prior to the feeling of pleasure we experience when we recognize our actions as consistent with the moral law. 28 Of course, by developing sympathetic feelings, etc., a virtuous person will come to experience the joy of satisfying her inclinations through her compliance with the moral law. Certainly, these facts will make her compliance with duty even less difficult and less burdensome. In other words, they will bring her even closer to feeling entirely unconstrained. 29 However, they reflect the fact that she already, prior to any promise of joy, does not regard the moral law as a tyrannous constraint but, instead, as an object of unqualified worth. 30 And, as I have argued above, this prior recognition of the moral law's unqualified worth depends on the feeling of sublimity that we experience when we contemplate the moral law.
Conclusion
As we have seen, Schiller aims to overcome the moral law's tyrannous appearance by allowing people to develop and act out of an inclination for duty. As a result, Schiller's position seems to require that anyone who has not yet developed an inclination for duty cannot help but feel the moral law as a tyrannous yoke. Consequently, Schiller faces the problem of explaining how people who feel tyrannized by the moral law and, thus, nurture a hatred for the moral law, will be able to develop their moral feelings and take increasing pleasure in moral action. Kant, however, does not attempt to overcome the moral law's alleged tyranny merely by emphasizing the role of pleasure in the virtuous life. Instead, Kant appeals to the feeling of sublimity that accompanies our contemplation of the moral law as the product of our own self-legislation. Here Kant, unlike Schiller, does not appear to regard the grace of outer appearance as simply the expression of ease in the unintentional aspects of our intentional moral movements. Instead, he suggests a much less specific criterion that we act, perhaps with conscious effort, in a decorous seeming fashion. For we, thus, help satisfy our duty to "make the estimable nature of virtue beloved" (AA 27:706/LE 432). Of course, we have seen that in Kant's view, true virtue allows for a type of harmony between pleasure and duty, although not precisely the same harmony that Schiller himself envisaged. And, presumably, this harmony would manifest itself in graceful movements more along the lines that Schiller himself had in mind. Second, Kant suggests that while the idea of duty is not by itself beautiful, the idea of virtue -which Kant defines as "the firmly grounded disposition to fulfill one's duty strictly" -certainly is (AA 6:23). For virtue, if practiced, has beneficent consequences for both the individual and society. As Kant writes: "And if we consider the gracious consequences that virtue would spread throughout the world, should it gain entry everywhere then the morally oriented reason (through the imagination) call sensibility into play" (AA 6:23/RRT 72).
it as a tyrannous constraint. Indeed, as people develop their moral feelings over time, they will come to feel less and less constrained by the moral law. However, this ability to develop our moral feelings over time depends on the fact that we do not nurse a hatred for the moral law and, thus, depends on the sublimity that accompanies our contemplation of the moral law. As such, this feeling of sublimity is integral to Kant's accounts of moral psychology and moral development.
Obviously, Kant sees no reason to question his basic metaphysical dualism between practical reason and sensibility in his reply to Schiller. Rather, following Schiller's lead, Kant simply hopes to
show that the moral law need not feel tyrannous even though practical reason is distinct from sensibility and rules over sensibility. To this end, Kant couches his argument primarily in terms of the positive feelings that accompany our awareness of the moral law. Indeed, the feeling of sublimity that accompanies our consideration of the moral law, rather than the joyful pleasures that accompany our fulfillment of the moral law, forms the core of Kant's response to Schiller. By focusing on the role played by this feeling in our overall moral experience, Kant avoids both Schiller's criticisms and the difficulties that plague Schiller's own account. If we focus primarily on the pleasures that Kant takes to accompany our fulfillment of the moral law and overlook Kant's own essential stress on the feeling of sublimity that accompanies our consideration of the moral law, then we do not merely mischaracterize 
